On The Evolution of Dowry in India
- Raj Chetty

Dowry-related abuse is now common throughout India: "dowry has become literally a burning problem….from 1 January to 1 November, 1983, 690 women had died of burns in Delhi alone." The situation has worsened since then. India Today reports that "Dowry deaths in Punjab have risen from 55 in 1986 to 157 already this year [1997]." Further, for every reported case of dowry-related abuse, sociologists estimate that almost 300 go unregistered.

But abuse is only the most graphic facet of the multitude of social problems associated with the dowry system. As an institution practiced by the vast majority of Hindu castes, the payment of dowry is usually the defining moment in the lives of families with one or more daughters. It can result in financial ruin, forcing parents to sell their homes or exhaust their savings to garner a groom for their daughter. The practice also reinforces stratification by forcing lower income families to marry their children to less affluent individuals. It tends to bolster gender inequality in that it portrays women as a burden that men must support financially. And the very idea that a market for human beings exists is repulsive to many individuals, who liken the concept to something of a peculiar slave market.

These social perceptions of dowry are not restricted to scholars or an elite minority of Indians – in fact, 70% of Indians state that they give dowry simply to "facilitate marriage," and do not condone the practice. Many Indians condemn dowry as "India’s disease" or "social evil." Why, then, do most Hindus hypocritically practice this custom, albeit surreptitiously?

This paper emphasizes the economic context of dowry-taking in Indian society, which are often overlooked in the hysteria concerning the social ills of the system. The first part of the paper synthesizes existing evidence and arguments to understand the evolution of the dowry system in past and present day India. While "traditional" and "modern" dowry developed in connection with the economy of rural India, today’s "post-modern" dowry hinders the growing industrial economy.

After sketching some of the salient characteristics of the dowry system, we argue that economic progress, especially in the female labor market, may be a necessary first step before the practice can be eliminated. While everyone realizes that society at large would be better off without dowry, individual families have no economic incentive not to take dowry for their sons. This suggests that some type of economic progress is needed before one can expect the average individual – who is apparently unconvinced by moral or social motives – to forego taking dowry. Moreover, dowry is only one manifestation of the broader problem of gender inequality in India. Giving women more education and economic autonomy will strengthen their bargaining position in the marriage market. As women’s education and work itself gains value in society, incentives to take dowry will be reduced. Thus, anti-dowry social campaigns should perhaps devote some effort to improving the economic and educational opportunities available to women.

Dowry developed in different castes and regions of India in several different ways. Using a broad categorization of the different transactions conducted by the bride’s and groom’s families, Srinivas has constructed two well accepted modes of dowry-taking – "traditional" dowry and "modern" dowry. One cannot find a distinct juncture at which the traditional form disappeared and the modern form emerged – in fact, a few castes still practice what Srinivas might consider the traditional form of the system. Nonetheless, the general transition seems to have occurred between late colonial times and World War II. Dowry first developed in the Vedic and post-Vedic period in three basic forms –a payment for a hypergamous marriage, a bride-price given to the bride’s family, and a gift to the new couple to get started. Hypergamous dowry was restricted to the North; bride-price prevailed in the South but was also practiced in some lower castes in the North; and various castes dispersed through the country gave gifts to the newlyweds. At this stage, the amounts exchanged were fairly small and were well defined by conventions within each jati (caste). As the socioeconomic structure of the South and the lower castes in the North changed, the dynamics of the dowry system changed accordingly. Srinivas argues that "modern dowry presupposes a high degree of monetization in the community, increased agricultural and general prosperity, and access to the organized sector." Unlike traditional dowry, "large sums of cash—frequently amounting to a few lakhs of rupees—are transferred…from the bride’s kin to the groom’s kin." In short, modern dowry would more aptly be termed a high groom-price.

The inception of dowry-taking in India has been attributed by some scholars to religious factors and by others to economic factors. The religion-based argument rests on the fact that in ancient times, marriage was considered a type of ritual sacrifice in which the bride, a gift to the groom, was accompanied by other smaller gifts known as dakshina. This practice was originally restricted to Brahmins and Kshatriyas, particularly in rural North India. Through the process of Sanskritization, in which the lower castes tried to emulate the upper castes in order to gain status, the concept of dowry spread throughout the country. The documentation of this practice in religious texts is vague – the Jatakas give an account of the "rich presents given to the bridegroom," and the Raguvansa describes the "handsome presents" sent by the King of Vidarbha. Sociologists who support this argument conclude that dowry is not fundamentally an outgrowth of the economic situation in early India.

Although the above theory may apply to certain castes in North India, the general evidence against the religion-based argument is more convincing. First, the above accounts of gift-giving cannot be taken as concrete evidence of dowry as a direct outcome of religious or cultural beliefs, since such presents "can hardly be called dowries, for they were made [as far as we know] voluntarily after the marriage out of affection." Second, in the post-Vedic period, Manu’s dictum states that "no father who knows the law [should] receive gratuity, however small, for giving his daughter in marriage, since that man…is a seller of his offspring." Further, the Apastamba-Smriti states that "not even a Sudra should accept money while giving away his daughter. Taking money is a sale in disguise." One may extrapolate that the same principle is intended to apply in the other direction, i.e. boys are not be "sold" either. Therefore, as sociologist Madan Paul argues, "dowry in any form was not sanctioned by the ancient Hindu religious scriptures." The religion-based argument thus cannot be taken as a comprehensive explanation of the origins of dowry in India.

The socioeconomic argument states that the system was the resulted from a societal framework in which marriage payments were considered appropriate or necessary. It is well documented in North India that hypergamy – marrying grooms whose social rank is higher than that of the bride’s but whose jati (caste) is the same – dictated that the bride’s family pay the groom’s family for enabling their daughter to move up in socio-economic status. In this case, the bride’s family paid the groom’s kin simply because they were effectively rising in class via marriage. Among the lower castes in the North, which initially did not practice hypergamy, the payment of bride-price was much more common. The intuition underlying this was that "bride-price is compensation paid to the parents of a girl for the loss of her services on marriage." Some sociologists have likened this payment to that of purchasing chattel – accordingly, the payment was fairly low since the "purchased" wife was both "used" and maintained by her husband and his family. This logic also accounts for the payment of bride-price among the many isogamous castes in the South in pre-British India.

In many other castes, a third rationale for the dowry system came into place. In certain cases during the pre-colonial period, neither child had much earning potential upon getting married – one needed some capital to begin working before he could live on his own salary. The newlyweds therefore needed some source of income for a few years. This was provided in the form of dowry. States sociologist B. Rani, "Dowry was a ‘natural gift’ given out of affection to the girl who was parting her parents and the basic intention of gifts so given was to help the young couple in running a household." These "natural gifts" were intended as a small sum of capital and goods (kitchen vessels, basic furniture, household items, etc.) that would enable the couple to get started. There seem to have been two reasons that the bride’s side provided this payment: first, since the woman traditionally did not inherit property (except for Kerala), the dowry began to serve as her contribution to the new family’s coffer. Second, due to the stigma that developed in later years of having an unmarried daughter of older age, parents were often eager to "dispose" of their daughters at opportune moments and were not loathe to pay some money to do so. Thus, "ethical [social] and economic reasons were instrumental in making the custom of dowry rigid" in pre-colonial India. At its very inception, dowry was based more on economic tenability than on religious or cultural ideas.

The transition to modern dowry involves two basic elements – the diminishing use of bride-price and, in castes already paying the groom’s side, the shift from a true dowry to the much more costly groom-price. First, why did the bride’s side eventually come to pay the groom’s side in nearly all castes? The evolution of bride-price to dowry in India has been studied by several scholars. Srinivas argues that as economic conditions improved, the lower castes found that "Sanskritizing" their customs by emulating the Brahmins would help their social and economic status. By giving up "bride-price, liquor drinking, meat eating, widow remarriage, etc." and replacing these with the Brahminic customs, the lower castes found that they could become "clean" and advance in society. Claims Srinivas, "emulation…leads to the replacement of bride-price by dowry." It is important to note that the lower castes wanted to emulate the upper castes mainly in order to get ahead socially and economically, and not simply because of religious doctrines or cultural beliefs.

In another approach to studying the reasons for the change from bride-price to dowry, Vijayendra Rao looks at some castes in Central and South India and finds that a "squeeze" in the marriage-market for grooms caused the switch. Noting an increase in population in the 20^th century in the castes he studied, Rao argues that since "women tend to marry older men, this implies that there will be a surplus of women over men in the marriage market….This phenomenon, known as the marriage squeeze, has led to the escalation of dowries." Thus, Rao attributes the change to an exogenous demographic change, which led to "too many girls chasing too few grooms." The timing of this shift seems to have varied between the various castes in the South and the North – although many changed practices in colonial times, a few continue to take payment for brides even today.

The second aspect of the shift to modern dowry, that of increasing groom-prices, has also been explained in a few different ways. Increasing monetization during the 19^th and 20^th centuries has allowed the type of goods that can feasibly be demanded to expand rapidly – instead of demanding "jewelry, clothes, domestic utensils…," the groom’s parents are more likely to settle for "a TV, VCR, fridge, car," or more likely, cash. In the latter case, the groom’s family can use the money given them in any way they see suitable, and rather than serving a capital pool for the newlyweds or a small payment for hypergamy, the dowry plays the role of money with which one purchases a groom. As economic prosperity and the size of the organized sector increased during British times, young men who were well educated or had good connections became highly-coveted generators of wealth in and of themselves. In pre-British times, one paid a small groom-price for a minor gain in family socioeconomic status. In post-colonial India, dowry has become a mechanism for parents to make money by selling their IAS-bound sons or doctors-to-be at fairly high prices. Endogamy and societal pressure to marry girls at a young age also contribute to inflation in the marriage market, as Rao argues in his paper on dowry inflation. Srinivas succinctly captures the flavor of the new dowry:

Again, one might attempt to explain this development culturally or religiously by referring to the common practice of dakshina in Vedic times. In traditional kanyadan weddings, the bride, a gift to the groom, was supposed to be accompanied by a small secondary gift, dakshina. By analogy, one might claim that dowry is a modern version of the religiously sanctioned dakshina. This is not true for several reasons. First, the fact that modern dowry is demanded either indirectly or directly precludes the possibility of it being a gift. Second, dakshina was strictly secondary in nature, but given the magnitude of modern dowries, the bride may actually have assumed the secondary role. Finally, tradition dictated that the bride would have complete control over the gifts; clearly, this is not the case in the groom-price paid today. This substantiates the argument that the underlying cause of the shift to modern dowry is none other than a socioeconomic change in society. As Srinivas puts it:

The existing literature indicates that cultural or religious movements are not the crucial determinants of dowry practices in India. Rather, economic factors lie at the heart of dowry-taking. Moreover, the dowry system may actually have been useful at the societal level given the socioeconomic situation in India during these times. In studying a prominent mercantile caste in South India, the Nattukottai Chettiyars (Nagarathars), Yuko Nishimura finds that "the never-ending process of dowry accumulation serves the caste well in that it also provides funds for their business." In the mercantile, traditional economy of past years in rural India, the hoarding of goods also served as a good method of investment diversification. After World War II, when men began to work on their own and earn salaries in a slightly more monetized and industrialized economy, the groom-price could be justified economically (to an extent) by arguing that it is "compensation for the economic dependence of the bride after marriage, since after marriage both wife and children are the man’s dependents." In a society that valued the sons of the household as wage earners, parents could invest at least in their sons education because they knew that his future bride would help fund part of it through the dowry he would garner. Since neither males nor females received much higher education in colonial India, investing in male education itself was a step forward for society. This socioeconomic situation – in which the economy afforded adequate opportunities only for male employment – lasted until the late 60s or early 70s. Thus, at least until the recent past, the dowry market seems to have been working properly – people have made decisions (such as the shift from traditional to modern dowry) based on their own interests that have helped society, at least in economic terms.

Can dowry still be justified economically today? And, if change in the system is warranted, can we continue to expect people to help society in the process of acting rationally? It is in this context that we look to the economic consequences of dowry in today’s India.

In the past two decades, dowries have increased so greatly in magnitude that nearly all sociologists have condemned the system as a "terrible social disease." A commonly quoted Tamil proverb today is that "Five daughters will ruin the wealthiest man." A few critical factors have contributed to "dowry’s [becoming] the perfect instrument for upward material mobility." First, increased affluence in some areas – Punjab is an example – has caused an upward spiral in dowry demands, resulting in the now common "Maruti marriages." Second, the amount of dowry taken has become a status symbol – 40% of families that took dowry state prestige as their primary reason for doing so. Third, with the increasing availability of information through the wide distribution of newspapers and, among wealthier classes, the Internet, marriage bids are taking on a new dimension. The Hindustan Times recently advertised: "Wanted: a suitable non-Goel Bisa Aggarwal match for an accomplished, handsome…girl of a well-to-do and well-connected family. Early ‘decent marriage.’…" The last phrase, "decent marriage," is a euphemism for stating that a significant groom-price will be paid. These socioeconomic shifts have led to a new "post-modern" dowry. The much larger post-modern dowry consists essentially of a down payment plus installments – after the initial dowry, one must continue paying the groom’s kin for a few years on occasions such as the birth of a child. The post-modern development is not restricted to India. A very similar type of payment came about in developing Greece, which also had used the dowry system for several centuries. Notes Jane Lambiri, for Greek men, "playing the game on ‘their own terms’ means asking for as large a dowry as possible; in exchange, the man offers the girl the much sought-after status of being a married woman, and in addition whatever other social assets he may possess."

The grooms’ families act in their own interests in seeking this post-modern form of dowry; but have they, as in the past, acted for the good of society at large? We believe that they have not, for two major reasons. First, the argument that dowry acts as a good form of savings for society is no longer valid in industrialized India, in which rapidly transferable liquid wealth is more useful than the stagnant hoarding of dowry. The use of dowry is restricted by customs – for instance, it would be considered inappropriate to sell marriage jewels and start a business – and by the ever-present need to pay daughters’ dowries. Savings in the form of loans and venture capital are readily available from banks or other institutional sources. For comparative evidence, consider Muriel Nazzari’s analysis of the decline of dowry in Brazil:

With current market liberalization and the reduction of licensing and regulation, India is going through the same transformation today as that which Nazzari noted in Brazil. Rather than helping Indian castes move forward economically, dowry is hampering their progress.

Second, the justification of dowry as a payment for the groom’s higher education also no longer holds. The post-modern dowry phenomenon is so extreme in nature that not even the most expensive education warrants such a payment. As one Indian sociologist puts it, "The money [is] not channelised productively. Instead of using it to enhance women's education, for instance, it [is] used to perpetuate ostentatious lifestyles." The very fact that dowry has become a status symbol indicates that it no longer has any productive use; instead, it is a peculiar manner of conspicuous consumption. What results is an unfortunate discrepancy between industrialized countries and developing India: in the US, most parents save for their child’s college education; in India, parents save for their daughters’ dowries. This is the crux of the economic problem with post-modern dowry. India’s economy can now accommodate more skilled laborers and will certainly benefit from greater women’s education. As Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen have pointed out, "the suppression of women from participation in social, political, and economic life hurts the people as a whole, not just women." They go on to discuss the immense benefits of women’s education for the entire society, arguing that educated women increase human development much more than educated men. The potency of women’s education in and of itself in relation to dowry is manifested by the fact that it is often the mother-in-law who is the initiator in taking dowry for her sons; with greater education, one can expect her to remember her own plight in making this choice. Girls, of course, could easily be educated by using the wealth invested in dowry (as jewels or cars) for their education.

Unlike in the past, when individuals’ personal interests in dowry have also acted for the general good of society, the development of post-modern dowry has adversely affected India not only socially but also economically. Why? In a classic example of a market failure, it is evident that people are not willing to forego an immediate source of revenue (dowry) for long run gains (human development). Such myopia is typical in free markets – for instance, firms have no economic incentive to restrict pollution in the short run, but in the long run everyone loses from excess pollution. Clearly, some form of market intervention is needed.

Initial attempts to tackle the dowry problem were mainly on the legal front. The Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, an impotent law that purports to "ban the payment of dowry…if reported by a third party," does little to reduce dowry as a means to increase one’s wealth. Very few cases have been prosecuted under this law – its only effect has been to make the transactions more surreptitious.

Activists in the past two decades have concentrated on the social failures of the system and has attempted to appeal to Indians from a moral and ethical perspective. The general theme of anti-dowry work today is to make the public aware of the problems in the hope that they will have the sense to stop demanding it. In arguing against the "evil of dowry," Srinivas recommends that:

But Srinivas is blinded by his own passion. As we noted above, most Indians are already well aware of the "social evil" but continue to practice it while condemning it. Simply reminding them of what they already know cannot do very much to help the situation. Similarly, having mentioned in her article that dowry has economic roots, Rani also lapses into an emphatic sociological critique of the system: "various voluntary organizations…should come forward to bring social awakening among the people." Effecting such a social change, however, is far from trivial, as evinced by the rapid increase in dowry taking while these campaigns were being conducted. Repeated attacks on a social level cannot easily succeed in an impoverished country where the need for money speaks to the average individual much more strongly than an abstract idea of social good.

How can we make not demanding dowry a sound economic decision for the average Indian family? Consider again how dowry was eliminated in other countries. Jane Lambiri argues that in "most European societies the advent of the Industrial Revolution marked a turning point in the history of the institution of dowry." The key changes – which resulted from the Industrial Revolution – that directly brought dowry to its demise were a rise in the educational standards, increasing participation of women in the labor force, and the weakening of the family as the central matchmaker. Accompanying these changes was the social consequence of recognizing "the woman’s right to play other roles in addition to the strictly biological ones of wife and mother." In sum, the critical change in European societies that ended dowry was that "a woman’s dowry [became] her education and her work."

The first signs of the effects of such a socioeconomic shift in India indicate that among the few castes in which a large number of the girls are well educated, parents of the groom may accept this earning potential in place of a dowry. One might counter that the traditional notion of girls always having to marry better educated boys will actually increase dowries. This contention, however, has less bite when the number of well educated girls is sufficient for the bride’s side to have a strong position in the marriage bargain. More specifically, as the majority of women gain earning power and education, they collectively have the power, like well placed grooms, to shop around and find a "good deal" within or outside their caste. Further, it is fairly clear that throughout India, Sanskritization or emulation of upper social classes is prevalent. By educating and empowering at least upper caste women, one could begin to generate a trickle-down effect in which the entire society experiences a transformation over time.

Attacking the "disease" as a specific outcome of the broader problem of gender inequality in India by empowering women is critical to the success of intensive social campaigns against dowry. If the groom’s parents come to realize that by demanding less from the bride’s kin, they will get an educated bride who will generate more wealth, then they will have a solid economic incentive to stop charging a groom-price. Substantiating this argument, Madan Paul’s statistical analysis reveals that "dowry is higher when women are dependent on their husbands and kin." Paul also notes that "the incidence of dowry is less when the women are employed but not altogether absent. It is practised as a matter of prestige." As women’s economic autonomy becomes the norm and not the exception, however, the remaining people who demand dowry should disappear. In a number of different economies, history has shown that a value as ephemeral as prestige has never been retained in the face of market pressure.

Dowry disappeared as a direct result of economic industrialization and the concomitant market pressure for greater women’s education and employment in Europe. Why, then, are more activist policies needed in India instead of simply leaving dowry to be handled by the "invisible hand?" "The answer," claims Hooja, "is that in our country there is much illiteracy and hence ignorance and stubbornness to permit a change in outlook." Unlike European countries, in which literacy was already fairly high before the economic revolution, India lags far behind other developing countries in this measure of human development. Its rural citizens cannot be expected to be as responsive to marriage market forces as those of European nations. Second, it is evident that fundamental cultural ideals – such as a patriarchal, male dominant system – are much more firmly entrenched in India. This, however, does not imply that an economic solution will not work: in fact, as discussed above, Indians are quite responsive to the economic climate of society. It simply gives us yet another reason to strengthen efforts to improve women’s education and economic participation in India.

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